Abstract: Though financial globalization should improve international risk sharing, empirical support is lacking. We develop a simple welfare-based measure that captures how far countries are from the ideal of perfect risk sharing. Applying it to data, we find evidence that international risk sharing has improved during globalization. Improved risk sharing comes mostly from the convergence in rates of consumption growth among countries rather than from synchronization of consumption at the business cycle frequency.
I. Introduction
In theory, globalization should enhance risk sharing. When agents have the opportunity to trade financial assets internationally, they can more easily diversify insurable risks-those that are minimized by sharing in large groups. Standard tests of risk sharing reveal these risks are still shared imperfectly.
3 Surprisingly, measures derived from these tests suggest that globalization has not improved the degree of international risk sharing. 4 We develop a new welfare-based measure of risk sharing. This measure indicates how well a country shares risk and how that country's risk sharing evolves over time. 5 It shows that international risk sharing has been improving over time, a finding consistent with theory and intuition.
Most previous studies of international risk sharing test the null hypothesis of perfect risk sharing. They take one implication of perfect risk sharing -a necessary condition for perfect risk sharing--as the null and check whether it is violated in the statistical sense. These tests are well designed and nearly always reject perfect risk sharing. 6 Other studies acknowledge that risks are not shared perfectly and focus instead on measuring the degree of risk sharing and how it has evolved. To date, these studies use measures well-designed to test for perfect risk sharing as their measures of how well risk sharing 3 For a review of empirical work, see Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei (2006) , Corcoran (2007) , and Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2007) . For the growth effect of global financial integration, see Obstfeld (1994a) , who builds a model where global diversification enhances growth in a small open economy. Bai and Zhang (2009) show that globalization may not lead to improved international risk sharing if markets are incomplete. 4 For the G7, OECD, and EU, there is some limited evidence of improved risk sharing. See Obstfeld (1994b) , Sorensen, Wu, Yosha, and Zhu (2007) . 5 In other words, our measure is not a test of perfect risk sharing; rather, it assesses the degree of risk sharing. 6 For instance, these studies might test whether growth rates of per capita consumption are equalized across countries, or the share of individual consumption is constant over time, or idiosyncratic consumption growth is uncorrelated with idiosyncratic endowment shocks. For a good example of this type of research, see Lewis (1996) . is progressing. 7 Unfortunately, this strategy confuses "necessary" with "necessary and sufficient" conditions for sharing risk. Testing a necessary condition follows the chain of logic:
If risk sharing is perfect, then some necessary condition, e.g., equal consumption growth rates, must hold at least for one frequency. 8 The statistical finding that the condition does not hold with the required probability allows one to infer that risk sharing is not perfect.
The logic does not, however, go in the opposite direction. If, for example, some regression coefficient or correlation coefficient should be unity under the null of perfect risk sharing, it is not appropriate to infer that risk sharing is better the closer is that measured coefficient to unity. It could be better, but it need not logically be so. The problem comes from making an inference about the degree of risk sharing from a test of one necessary condition that does not fully characterize risk sharing. There are a number of necessary conditions and all of them must point towards improved risk sharing for one to conclude that risk sharing has improved. Put differently, one must take into account necessary and sufficient conditions for risk sharing rather than a single necessary condition in order to make claims about the degree of international risk sharing.
Our contribution is to propose a risk sharing measure that, under conditions we explore below, is a complete characterization of risk sharing. Accordingly, we can use it to measure how closely countries come to the benchmark of perfect risk sharing when the null of perfect risk sharing is rejected. We can also use it to study how risk sharing has evolved and to compare risk sharing across countries.
Our new measure is the conditional variance of the log ratio of individual-country per capita consumption to world per capita consumption. The variance is a monotonic transformation of a simple social welfare function that is valid whether or not risks are shared perfectly. Under perfect risk sharing, this variance is zero. The farther a country is from perfect risk sharing, the bigger the variance and, other things constant, the lower is social welfare. Lucas (1987) observed that the welfare gain from slightly higher average output growth can make up for the welfare loss from small increases in business-cycle fluctuations. In the context of international risk sharing, the convergence of average consumption growth rates across countries turns out to be far more important than the convergence of consumption at the business-cycle frequency. 9 Our measure captures improved risk sharing arising from both sources-the convergence in rates of consumption growth among countries found at low frequency and the greater synchronization of consumption found at the business-cycle frequency.
We believe convergence in consumption growth rates may be achieved through technology transfer, while greater synchronization of consumption at the business-cycle frequency may be achieved by income transfers that come from trading assets or writing insurance contracts.
Taking the new measure to data, we find that international risk sharing has improved during the globalization period for industrial countries and, to a lesser extent, for emerging markets. The improvement, however, comes mainly from convergence of consumption growth rates among countries. We find that risks from consumption growth differences are about twice the size of business-cycle-frequency risks for both industrial countries and emerging markets.
Convergence of these growth differences since 1965 has been dramatic for industrial countries.
9 Becker and Hoffmann (2006) and Artis and Hoffmann (2007, 2008) are among the few emphasizing long-run risk sharing. van Wincoop (1999) addresses this point as well. He shows that gains from international risk sharing are small if countries' growth rates are cointegrated and big if they are random walks. Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) find that shocks to trend growth rather than transitory shocks are the primary source of fluctuations in emerging markets.
Emerging markets have poorer risk sharing than industrial countries and have shown improvement only over the last 10 years of our 1960-2004 sample.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the new measure and relate it to agents' welfare. We also decompose the measure into low-frequency and highfrequency components. Section III takes the measure to data and shows how international risk sharing has evolved over the 1960-2004 period. Section IV concludes.
II. A New Measure of Risk Sharing
We want a simple measure, but one that can be tied to theory and yield welfare implications. To start, we specify the social welfare of any consumption allocation and compare it to the optimal allocation. Maximizing social welfare requires minimizing a particular expression. We then develop an empirical counterpart to this expression as our empirical measure of international risk sharing.
Consider a simple two-agent economy. At time t, let social welfare be 
Let the solution be
 is agent one's optimal share of total consumption at t . Importantly, the optimal share does not depend on the realization of the random variables.
10
Define social welfare with the optimal allocation as
Now, any allocation can be written as
where 1,t v is log deviation of the actual from the optimal consumption share for agent one at t .
We evaluate social welfare of the actual allocation by taking a second-order approximation of the social welfare function around the optimal allocation (where 1, 0
10 See Duffie (2001, Chapter 1) for a detailed treatment. In a market economy with complete asset markets, the optimal allocation can be achieved even before the realization of the random endowment variables since 1,t  reflects initial wealth.
(1 ) 
We then compare this actual allocation to the optimal allocation:
(1 ) '
where
The first bracketed term in (6) is zero from equation (2). The second bracketed term is negative because of the concavity of the utility function. Thus, (6) implies that maximizing social welfare requires minimizing
The next step is to develop an empirical counterpart to the theoretical construct:
, where ln( ) ln( ).
First, we interpret agent one as the representative agent in country i and agent two as the representative agent in the rest of the world. We associate This strategy turns our measure into a familiar statistic, the conditional sample variance: 2   2  2  2  , , ,
We evaluate the degree of risk sharing for 15-year windows and 20-year windows, so 15, 20 T  .
The measure in (8) completely characterizes risk sharing. It takes into account necessary and sufficient conditions for sharing risk internationally. As the measure approaches zero, the benchmark for perfect risk sharing, country i increasingly shares risk internationally. All else equal, country i also achieves higher welfare.
Two points are worth emphasizing. First, our measure covers all insurable risks. When risk sharing is perfect according to our measure, the only risks that remain involve world-wide consumption, which is uninsurable. Second, our measure is a conditional one and hence it does not become badly behaved when applied to trending or otherwise non-stationary variables.
Our measure does not distinguish whether a country achieves higher risk sharing intentionally or by chance. But it does have some clear advantages. Not only is it tied to welfare, it also provides some insight about the source of improved risk sharing --whether it comes from business cycle synchronization or from growth rate convergence.
Frequency Decomposition
Countries can share both high-frequency risks -such as those at the business-cycle frequency -and low-frequency risks that arise over longer time periods. Both types of risk sharing are captured in our measure. It is interesting to ask whether improved risk sharing comes primarily from better insuring high-frequency or low-frequency risks. Over various sample periods and country groupings, are countries showing mostly greater synchronization of consumption over the business-cycle frequency or is it the convergence in consumption growth rates that dominates?
We provide insight into this issue by decomposing our risk-sharing measure into highand low-frequency components. Later, we study the decomposition in data. The analytics of decomposing our risk measure are as follows. Let g be the average growth rate of , , , ln ln
Given (9), our risk-sharing measure in (8) can be re-written as
T T i t n i i t n
Expanding this expression, we find that
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (11) 
III. Taking the New Measure to Data
We construct our risk sharing measure using data from the Penn World Tables, Version   6 .2 (Heston, Summers and Aten 2006) . We create the world per capita consumption index by accumulating weighted-average growth rates of per-capita consumption in countries regarded as the world. The definition of 'world' in our study is simply the countries in our sample apart from country i. Different definitions of 'world' do not significantly change the results because aggregate world consumption is determined mainly by major industrial countries. 11 The importance of the industrial countries implies also that if the quality of the data in these countries is good, then even if there are some non-industrial countries with poorer data quality, the main conclusions regarding each group of countries will not change much as our risk sharing measure 11 We considered other definitions of "world" as well, such as the set of all countries (including own county i), the G-7 countries, and the Industrial countries. Results with these alternative definitions are available from the authors.
uses only world and own consumption levels. Of course, risk sharing measures regarding individual countries depend crucially on the individual countries' data quality. We use data on private consumption, but the results are very similar when we use total (private plus public)
consumption. 12 Use of aggregate consumption instead of per capita consumption also gives similar results. Figures 4, 5 and 6 attach 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals to the estimates in Figure 2 . We find that industrial countries improved risk sharing significantly during the second 12 We use rgdpl (International dollars in 2000 Constant Prices) multiplied by kc (Consumption Share of rgdpl) as our measure of per capita private consumption and rgdpl multiplied by kc+kg as per capita total (private plus public) consumption. For a detailed description, see Heston, Summers and Aten (2006) . For the derivation of world per capita consumption, see the Appendix. 13 Our country groupings are from Kose et al (2003) and are listed in the Appendix.
Results
half of the 1970s and the 1980s but have not shown much change thereafter. We find that emerging countries, both the MFIE and LFIE groupings, have improved (point estimate) their risk sharing during the recent globalization era, since about 1995. This improved risk sharing came after an earlier period when their risk sharing actually worsened. However, the confidence interval is too wide to be conclusive and the statistical significance of the improved risk sharing for LIFE and MIFE is somewhat debatable. For the entire sample period, regardless of the length of the window, we find a robust and intuitive ranking of country groups' risk sharing -industrial countries share risks best, MIFE second and LFIE last. 14 In both figures, there is always the tendency for richer countries to share risks better than poorer ones. Moreover, the risk-sharing order of countries rarely changes.
In Figure 9 , we pull out of our aggregated groups the results for the United States, Japan, and India as examples. The figure shows that the United States, for most of the period, shares risks better than Japan and India. The variance (and standard deviation) of the ratio of per capita consumption to world per capita consumption is small for the United States and has fallen dramatically for Japan. For India, the measure rose and then fell in the first half of the period; it continued falling but then rose again in the second half.
Decomposing our measure into its high-frequency and low-frequency parts yields further information. Later we show that high-frequency risk is a small portion of total risk and sharing it has changed little over the period. Low-frequency risk makes up the bulk of risk and sharing it has improved for all groups over some part of the period. In terms of Figure 9 , we conjecture that low-frequency risk sharing has improved greatly for Japan and has largely been accomplished for the United States. For the United States, its reasonably good international risk sharing reflects the fact that its per capita consumption growth tracks closely the growth in the rest of the world over a long period. In Japan's case, its improved international risk sharing is the result of having successfully completed its economic miracle. Following World War II, Japan's per capita consumption growth exceeded that of many countries; its rapid growth allowed it to become a rich industrial nation, but it also meant higher variance in its ratio of per capita consumption to world per capita consumption in the process-a measure of poor international risk sharing. Once Japan's per capita consumption growth started to look like that in the rest of the world, its measured risk sharing improved.
In India's case, prior to its reform in the early 1990s, its per capita consumption growth was not outstanding. Its improved international risk sharing in the late 1970s and early 1980s
shows that its per capita consumption growth began moving closer to world growth rates. After its reform, India experienced rapid growth. Though faster growth helps India catch up to the rest of the world, the higher variance in its ratio of per capita consumption to world per capita consumption means that it is not sharing risk internationally as well as before.
We now formalize these observations for various country groupings. Figure 10 and Figure 11 depict the decomposition of our measure by showing the crosscountry means of the first and the second terms of equation (11) over time. Lower values indicate better risk sharing. In Figure 10 , we see that the high-frequency component is without trend for all country groups and it is quite noisy for MFIE and LFIE. This lack of trend may be part of the reason why other measures of international risk sharing, whose focus is high frequency, cannot detect improved risk sharing. However, from Figure 11 we see that the lowfrequency component is without trend over the full sample period for the emerging country groups MFIE and LFIE, but shows an improvement more recently. For the Industrial countries, we see dramatic improvement early in the sample period. Indeed, the early improvement is so strong that there is little room for additional low-frequency improvement later on.
Results of High-Low Frequency Decomposition
Note that while we find improved risk sharing is mostly due to convergence in consumption growth rates, our finding should be distinguished from a simple growth convergence story. 15 Growth convergence suggests poor countries eventually catch up to the output levels of rich countries. Consequently even if two countries do not share risks, they will eventually achieve convergence in consumption levels. Our measure would pick up the lack of risk sharing since the poor country's consumption share in world consumption would be increasing during the growth convergence process. Indeed, Japan in the earlier sample period, and China in the later sample period, exhibit poor risk sharing since their consumptions grew very fast.
It should be noted also that a simple growth convergence story implies that difference in growth rates will become zero. Typically, economists assume that total factor productivity (TFP) grows exogenously, but that does not imply convergence in consumption growth rates in autarky unless long-run exogenous growth rates of TFP happen to be the same among countries.
In contrast, improved international risk sharing implies greater convergence in consumption growth rates among countries. Such improved risk sharing may be achieved by technological transfers as well as income transfers made possible by trading assets internationally and writing insurance contracts.
IV. Conclusion
We propose a simple measure of international risk sharing when risk sharing is not perfect. Our measure gauges the degree of risk sharing rather than tests for perfect risk sharing.
Our measure is welfare-based and permits an economic interpretation. When our measure is zero, it implies perfect risk sharing. When it differs from zero, it indicates how far a country is from the ideal of perfect risk sharing. In addition, our measure shows to what extent greater risk sharing is due to increased business-cycle synchronization or convergence in consumption growth rates.
When we apply our measure of international risk sharing to data, we find that countries on average are sharing risk better during the era of financial globalization than previously. While this finding should not be surprising, it is not what other measures uncover. The other measures have two problems. First, they are well designed to reject the null of perfect risk sharing, but poorly suited to measuring changes in risk sharing once the null is rejected. Second, other measures ignore consumption growth-rate differences and focus on whether per capita consumption across countries is synchronized at the business-cycle frequency. Our measure incorporates both low-frequency and high-frequency elements.
The risk sharing we uncover is not short-term, brought about through insurance contracts or trading country-risk-specific securities. It is a long-term phenomenon, driven perhaps by output-growth-rate convergence related to trade in ideas and technologies and to diffusion of institutions, which Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei (2006) call the collateral benefits of globalization. Our measure is not designed as a test for perfect risk sharing, but our measure is consistent with the existing view that perfect risk sharing remains a distant goal. Moreover, our new measure shows that risk sharing has improved over time because industrial countries' consumption growth rates have converged dramatically since the 1960s and consumption growth rates for emerging markets started converging in the 1990s. 
